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In the SupreJDe Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH 
Respondent, 
vs. 
THOMAS R. ROBINSON 
A. ppellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Case No. 
7292 
This is an appeal by the defendant, Thomas Ray 
Robinson, from the verdict finding him guilty of the 
crime of rape and from the judgment of the trial court 
and from the whole thereof. Appellant's argument is 
that there was insufficient evidence to convict, and that 
there was no lawful evidence to support the judgment 
of conviction and sentence. The argument is based pri-
marily upon the fact that Avis Barter, a 14-year-old 
girl with subnormal intelligence, was permitted without 
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4 
objection to testify to the necessary facts to establish 
the corpus delicti of the crime of rape. Respondent takes 
the position that there was sufficient competent evi-
dence to support the conviction and has organized ar-
gument under the following assertions: 
ASSERTION NO. 1 
QUESTIONS OF COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES AND 
EVIDENCE CANNOT BE RAISED FOR THE 
FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
ASSERTION NO. 2 
THE PROSECUTING WITNESS HAD SUFFICIENT 
MENTAL CAPACITY TO BE A 
COMPETENT WITNESS. 
ASSERTION NO. 3 
THE TESTIMONY OF THE STATE'S WITNESSES WHO 
TESTIFIED TO THE ACTS AND DECLARATIONS 
OF THE PROSECUTING WITNESS WAS 
COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
STATE~IENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's brief contains a resume of the evidence 
and therefore respondent refrains from presenting any 
independent statement of facts, except where respon-
dent will refer to certain testimony which appellant 
failed to point out in his brief. 
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r\SSER.TIO~ NO. 1 
QUESTIOXS OF COMPETENCY OF \YITNESSES AND 
EVIDEXCE C.-\.NNOT BE RAISED FOR THE 
FIRST TI~IE ON APPEAL. 
Appellant's contention, that an objection to the 
sufficiency of an infornwtion 1nay be raised for the 
first time on appeal, will be disregarded inasmuch as 
the point is not urged, nor is there any indication of 
insufficiency of the information in appellant's brief. 
Respondent, however, challenges appellant's corollary 
namely, that an objection that there is no evidence to 
prove the offense charged may be raised for the first 
time on appeal. 
At no time during the course of the trial did de-
fendant's counsel object to the testimony of Avis Bar-
ter, nor did he object to the testi1nony of other wit-
nesses who testified to the acts and declarations made 
by Avis Barter subsequent to the offense charged and 
prior to the trial. It is rather obvious that counsel's 
reason for not objecting to the testimony of these wit-
nesses, including that of A vis Barter, was that he was 
anxious to have in evidence the time during which the 
alleged offense occurred so that he could later put on 
evidence to establish defendant's alibi. In other words, 
apparently counsel was more interested in the alibi as 
a defense than he was in the exclusion of the evidence 
for the state which he might have thought incompetent. 
Concerning this type of tactics, Jones in his Com-
mentaries on Evidence, at volume 5, page 3904, has the 
following to say: 
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"If, after examination in chief has begun, 
it (preliminary inquiry into competency) is not 
made upon discovery, it is waived. A party know-
ing facts which would disqualify the witness if 
brought to the attention of the court is not per-
Initted to let the testimony go in while listening 
thereto to determine whether it will be favorable, 
and then move to strike out the testimony on the 
ground that the witness who gave it was incom-
petent.**** 
"***and plainly error cannot be protected 
on consideration of the testimony of a witness 
on the ground that such witness was incompe-
tent where no objection whatever on the score 
of incompetency as a witness was made at the 
trial. * * * * " 
Jones cites: People vs Evans, 63 Cal. App. 777, 
220 Pac. 309; and Carr vs State (Okla. Crim.) 211 
Pac. 423. 
The general rule is stated in 24 C.J.S. 268, as fol-
lows: 
"It is an almost universal rule that ques-
tions not raised in the trial court will not be con-
sidered on appeal." 
An exception is discussed in the same volume at page 
307, concerning the rna tter of jurisdiction. 
In discussing the question of competency of evi-
dence and applying the above quoted general rule, Cor-
pus Juris cites a Utah case, State vs. Murphy, 68 Pac. 
(2d) .188; 92 Utah 382. Similarly, according to Corpus 
Juris, the rule is applied to the competency of witnesses, 
and objections thereto, unless raised at the trial, will 
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not be available on appeal. People vs Collins, 5 Cal. 
App. 654; 91 Pac. 158. 
It is interesting to note that although in the State 
of Texas the cases seem to have required less evidence 
of insanity to render a witness incompetent than in 
other states, the court in the case of Hubbard vs State 
(1912) 66 Tex. Crim. Rep. 378, 147 S. W. 260, held 
that unless the questions were raised at the trial, the 
appellate court could not go into the matter. The court 
in assigning its reason for dismissing appellants argu-
ment that the prosecuting witness was not competent 
to testify, said: 
"The record shows that the appellant did 
not object to the testimony of the witness Melis-
sa Jennings at the time she testified nor did he 
attempt, so far as the record shows, to show on 
his voir dire examination that she was so insane 
as to prevent her testifying." 
ASSERTION NO. 2 
THE PROSECUTING WITNESS HAD SUFFICIENT 
MENTAL CAPACITY TO BE A 
COMPETENT WITNESS. 
It might be well at this point to quote Section 104-
49-2, Utah Code Annotated 1943, so far as it pertains 
to witnesses of unsound mind: 
"The following persons cannot be witnesses: 
1-Those who are of unsound mind at the time 
of their production for examination." 
We find no annotations to this particular provision. 
However, we cite State vs Williams, 180 Pac. (2d) 
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551, a case recently decided by this court and cited by 
appellant as similar to the case at bar. In that case this 
court held that the admission of testimony of a girl of 
subnormal intellect over the objection of defense coun-
sel was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion. It 
is indicated in the court's opinion that there was a diffi-
culty on the part of the complaining witness to under-
stand questions, quite similar to that of Avis Barter, if 
not worse. Yet the court in sustaining the trial judge's 
ruling said: 
"Furthermore, the witness, insofar as re-
vealed by the record, had difficulty in under-
standing questions of an uncomplicated nature 
propounded to her by counsel. However, the 
trial judge had the advantage of having the wit-
ness before him. He was in a position to observe 
not only her demeanor but the tempo of ques-
tion and answer, the attitude and tone of voice 
of counsel and the probable effect upon the child 
of the court room environment. Hence, much of 
importance to his decision respecting the com-
petency of the witness was available to the trial 
judge which the record does not reveal to us. 
He exercised his discretion in the light of such 
additional factors, and we are unable to say with 
conviction that his ruling thereon was an abuse 
of such discretion. See State v. MacMillan, 46 
Utah 19, 145 P. 833; State v. Morasco, 42 Utah 
5, 128 P. 571; State v. Blythe, 20 Utah 378, 
379, 58 P. 1108." 
Respondent submits that under the Williams case 
a trial court should find no particular difficulty in per-
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mitting a witness of the mental capacity of A vis Bar-
ter to testify. 
Referring again to Jones' Commentaries on Evi-
dence, \r ol. 5, the following is found at page 3971: 
"The general rule, therefore, is that a luna-
tic or person affected with insanity may testify 
as a witness if he has sufficient understanding to 
apprehend the obligation of an oath and to be 
capable of giving a correct account of the mat-
ters which he has seen or heard in reference to 
the questions at issue. Whether he has that un-
derstanding is a question to be determined by 
the court, upon examination of the party him-
self and any con1petent witnesses who can speak 
to the nature and extent of the insanity." 
And at page 3948, included in a general discussion on 
mental capacity, is the following: 
"It is not necessary to discuss the proposi-
tion that a witness is not to be excluded as in-
competent by reason of the fact that his mem-
ory is somewhat defective, or because his means 
of knowledge may not be equal to that of other 
persons who might have been called as witnesses. 
Obviously these are objections which affect the 
credibility and not the competency of the wit-
nesses." 
At the trial, evidence was adduced to the effect 
that Avis Barter's mental capacity was that of a five 
year old child. There are many things concerning which 
a child of five years is competent to testify. Though 
she may have been confused and had difficulty in un-
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derstanding questions concerning distances, time, and 
number of blocks, etc., she was certainly competent 
when she came to the matter of describing the interior 
of the green coupe. Any 5-year old child would re-
member the ball and flower hanging from the top of 
the windshield. 
The courts recognize that there are many things 
of which a person of subnormal intellect may testify. 
An example of this is that in many cases of rape com-
mitted against the person of a victim of unsound mind, 
the victim has been permitted to testify in behalf of 
the state. An annotation of these cases is found in 
148 A.L.R. at page 1153. The general rule is stated 
as follows: 
"In prosecutions for rape upon a female 
of unsound or imbecile mind, the mental condi-
tion of the victim, even if rendering her incap-
able of consenting to the act, does not suffice 
to render her incompetent ·as a witness against 
the perpetrator, who must ~how that she fails 
to meet the tests of appreciation of the nature of 
an oath and ability to so answer questions as to 
express a correct reproduction of facts, in order 
to exclude her." 
ASSERTION NO. 3 
THE TESTIMONY OF THE STATE'S WITNESSES WHO 
TESTIFIED TO THE ACTS AND DECLARATIONS 
OF THE PROSECUTING WITNESS WAS 
COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
Appellant argues that the testimony of persons 
other than the prosecutrix in which they testify to 
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acts and declarations of the prosecutrix subsequent to 
the asserted attack on her and prior to the trial is in-
admissable, as being heresay. One of the exceptions to 
the heresay rule, however, is the res gestae rule, which, 
as applied to this case, means that declarations and acts 
of the victim, .... ~vis Barter, Iuade soon after the alleged 
criminal attack upon her, as testified to by third per-
sons, are competent evidence of the corpus delicti. The 
writer of an annotation in 157 A.L.R. at page 1363, 
discusses the admissibility of statements of the victim 
in rape cases as part of res gestae as follows: 
Declarations admitted as res gestae consti-
tute original evidence and are not admitted as 
corroborative of a witness but on the theory that 
they are verbal acts connected with the trans-
action and calculated to illustrate its character. 
Under this theory, although the victim of rape or 
a similar offense is not a witness, both the fact 
that she made complaint and the details thereof 
are admissible in evidence where her statements 
and declarations were made under such circum-
stances as to constitute a part of the res gestae. 
Cases are cited where complaints were made sev-
eral moments after, even as much as an hour and a 
half after, the offense was committed, and where the 
admission of such complaints, statements or declara-
tions was not held to be error. 
The above quoted annotation also states that al-
though there is a conflict of authority several cases have 
held that, where the victim is incompetent to testify, 
evidence of the fact she made complaint is admissible 
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even though not a part of the res gestae. See page 1361 
of 157 A.L.R. _citing several cases which support the 
proposition that if Avis Barter had been barred from 
testifying as an incompetent witness, the court under 
the rule of these cases could properly admit, as it did, 
the testimony of others to the effect that Avis Barter 
made complaint of the offense. 
An inference derived from the above annotation is 
that if the victim is allowed to testify then there is no 
question about the admissibility of evidence of her 
declarations to others as corroborating evidence. There-
fore if this court should hold that Avis Barter was 
properly permitted to testify, it would seem there is 
no question about the admission of evidence of her 
declarations and acts subsequent to the offense and 
prior to the trial. 
If, however, this court should rule that the tes-
timony of Avis Barter was improperly admitted, even 
though no objection was raised at the trial, it then 
becomes necessary to decide whether or not evidence 
of said declarations and acts should have been ad-
mitted. If the court follows what we submit is the ma-
jority rule, that declarations and acts by the victim 
shortly after the alleged sexual offense are admissible 
as part of the res gestae, then it is submitted there 
is sufficient evidence to convict. 
Mr. Heath testified to declarations made by Avis 
Barter in which Avis described the man who attacked 
her and also the automobile that was involved. (Tr. 
105, 106). This was within 15 minutes of the time Avis 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
arrived at the hmne of her aunt, ~1rs. Brimhall, A vis 
haYing arrived there at 1 :~5 P.l\L (Tr. 67) and having 
commenced her conversation with Mr. Heath at 2:00 
P.)I. (Tr. 69). About 30 minutes later, after Avis had 
been returned to her hmne, a car drove up to the home 
of )lr. and ~Irs. Barter, and ~Irs. Barter testified to 
AYis's declaration as follows: 
Q. Did you see the defendant, who sits at the 
counsel table on the right hand side of coun-
sel table on that day? 
A. 1"" es, sir. 
Q. And about what tirne was it you first saw 
him? 
A. Well, it was going on for two thirty when 
they brought him back in front of our house. 
Q. Where was Avis at that time? 
A. She was in the house with us. 
Q. And was Avis with you when you first saw 
him? 
A. Yes, she was in the front room. 
Q. I will ask you to state whether or not she 
identified this man? 
A. Yes, sir; she was the first one. We heard 
the siren on the car and she hollered, aoh, 
here they come. They have got him. That is 
the car and the man., That is just the way 
she worded it before we all got to the win-
dow to see for ourselves. 
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It is submitted that this exclamation coming spon-
taneously and so soon after the offense must certainly 
be considered as part of the res gestae. 
CONCLUSION 
The testimony of Avis Barter was properly ad-
mitted, and was sufficient for conviction. This testi-
mony was supported by properly admitted evidence 
of acts and declarations of Avis Barter as part of the 
res gestae and as complaints corroborating her testi-
mony. 
Any questions as to the competency of the witness 
or evidence should have been raised at the trial, and 
not having done so, appellant is barred from raising 
them on appeal. For these reasons it is submitted that 
your honorable court should affirm the judgment of 
the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINTON D. VERNON, 
Attorney General 
ROBERT S. RICHARDS, 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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